I completed PhD coursework in Labor Economics and Industrial Organization. I do research in applied economics revolving around the study of worker productivity. My work generally is in the areas of Labor Economics, Industrial Organization, Sports Economics, Health Economics, and the Economics of Education. For a more detailed description of my current work and what I plan to work on moving forward, take at my research statement, linked below.
Job Market Paper (A): New Evidence in the Study of Shirking in Major League Baseball
Abstract: This paper uses Major League Baseball data to examine the relationship between years remaining on player contracts and player performance. There is a potential for moral hazard to arise in this principal-agent relationship as the player may choose a less than optimal level of effort from the perspective of the team when the player has many guaranteed years remaining. A player fixed-effects estimation strategy is employed which finds a negative, significant relationship between years remaining and performance. The primary contribution of this work is to show that this relationship is due to shirking. Alternative explanations for this relationship, that teams sign improving players to multi-year contracts or players face an adjustment process when joining a new team, are addressed. Additional evidence shows that shirking occurs on offense, not defense, and for position players, not pitchers.
Most Recent Version: Job Market Paper 111818
Job Market Paper (B): It’s a party in the MLB: An analysis of shirking between games in Major League Baseball
Abstract: This paper uses game-level Major League Baseball (MLB) player data to identify whether players with greater job security shirk in their preparation between games. Past work has identified evidence of moral hazard arising in multi-year MLB player contracts, but little work has been done in identifying when shirking takes place. Using a difference-in-differences estimation strategy, this study finds evidence of an inverse relationship between the number of years remaining on player contracts and player performance when the player is playing on short rest, but not on long rest. Using a triple-difference specification, evidence is found that this differential performance by length of rest occurs for games played in “party cities”. Additional evidence is presented which would also suggest that monitoring is an important factor for limiting between-game shirking. Party-city shirking is found to be driven by players on the home team, who end the night at home, rather than visiting players, who end the night at the same hotel as the rest of the team and management.
Most Recent Version: Shirking Between Games 100719
Publications: “Patterns of buprenorphine/naloxone prescribing: An analysis of claims data from Massachusetts”, The American Journal of Drug and Alcohol Abuse, vol. 46(2), 2020, pp. 216-223. (with A. Modestino, M. Hasan, M. Alam, L. Young, and G. Young)
“Reducing Inequality Summer by Summer: Lessons from an Evaluation of the Boston Summer Youth Employment Program”, Evaluation and Program Planning, vol. 72, 2019, pp. 40-53. (with A. Modestino)
“Contract Options and Performance: The Case of Major League Baseball”, Atlantic Economic Journal, vol. 46(4), 2018, pp. 379-388.
Other Unpublished Drafts:
“Arts Majors as Entrepreneurs and Innovators” (with N. Alper and G. Wassall)
“School’s Out: How Summer Youth Employment Programs Impact Academic Outcomes” (with A. Modestino)